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SYMPOSIUM
THE ROOKER-FELDMAN DOCTRINE
FOREWORD

ROOKER-FELDMAN: WORTH ONLY THE POWDER
TO BLOW IT UP?

Thomas D. Rowe, Jr.*
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is an oddity among limits on federal
courts' subject matter jurisdiction. Named after generative cases decided six decades apart,' it rests innocuously enough on the proposition that Congress has conferred appellate jurisdiction over state
court judgments upon only one federal court, the Supreme Court of
the United States. 2 It proceeds from there to the main point for
which it has come to stand, that federal district courts lack jurisdiction
to entertain claims that are "inextricably intertwined" with the merits
Elvin R. Latty Professor of Law, Duke University. B.A. Yale 1964; M. Phil.
Oxford 1967;J.D. Harvard 1970. For the subtitle I am indebted to an e-mail message
from Prof. David Shapiro of Harvard Law School, marveling at the spilling of the
amounts of ink that follow on a doctrine that "justifies only the purchase of the
powder needed to blow it up." E-mail from David Shapiro, Jan. 2, 1999 (on file with
author).
1 District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker
v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). The Feldman of the more recent case was
Marc Feldman, a sometime law professor at Rutgers-Camden and Maryland, who died
just last year. Prof. Jack Beermann's contribution to this Issue gives some further
details of Prof. Feldman's inteiesting career. See Jack M. Beermann, Comments on
Rooker-Feldman or Why We Should Let State Law Be Our Guide, 74 NoTRE DAME L. REv.
1209, 1210 n.3 (1999).
2 See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1994) (conferring Supreme Court certiorari jurisdiction
over "[f] inaljudgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a
decision could be had"); cf., e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994) (authorizing original jurisdiction over federal-question actions); 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1994) (authorizing original jurisdiction over diversity and alienage actions).
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of a judgment already rendered by a state court system, at least in an
3
action involving the same parties.
The oddity arises because Rooker-Feldman is quite unlike the usual
sort of limit on the original subject matter jurisdiction of federal
courts. The doctrine can have effect only when a case brought in federal district court is generally within original federal jurisdiction-or
would be, except for prior state court adjudication that is not supposed to be subject to review in any federal court other than the
Supreme Court. The very fact that other state-court adjudication has
taken place will often raise a barrier to the federal court's reaching
the merits, on nonjurisdictional grounds independent of the RookerFeldman doctrine. Most commonly the barrier will be interjurisdictional preclusion (or, for those who prefer older terminology, statefederal resjudicata), although the jurisdictional nature of Rooker-Feldman makes the doctrine's bar unwaivable and subject to being raised
by the court on its own motion.4 Depending on whether Rooker-Feld5
man applies only to finaljudgments of highest available state courts,
other grounds such as "Our Federalism"'6 or a different abstention
3

See Feldman, 460 U.S. at 486-87. The Court noted:
[R]espondents' . . . allegations ... required the District Court to review a

final judicial decision of the highest court of a jurisdiction in a particular
case. These allegations are inextricably intertwined with the District of Columbia Court of Appeals' decisions, in judicial proceedings, to deny the respondents' petitions. The District Court, therefore, does not have
jurisdiction over these elements of the respondents' complaints.
Id.
For general reference on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, see 18 JAMES WM. MOORE
§ 133.30[3] (3d ed. 1999); 18 CHARLES ALAN
WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4469, at 663-68 (1981); id. at
529-31, 535-51 (Supp. 1998). Federal habeas corpus for state prisoners, in which the
applicant brings a collateral attack on a state court conviction in what is technically a
new federal court civil action, is commonly regarded as a statutory exception to the
Rookei-Feldmanjurisdictional limit. See 18 MooRE's, supra, § 133-3013] [a], at 133-22.
4 See 18 MOORE's, supra note 3, § 133.30[3] [b], at 133-22 to -23.
5 So limiting the doctrine's applicability could make sense in light of its roots in
28 U.S.C. § 1257, which grants the Supreme Court certiorari jurisdiction only over
"[f]
inal judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a
decision could be had." See supra note 2 and accompanying text; see also supra note 3
(quoting from Supreme Court's Feldman opinion referring to impermissibility of federal district court's reviewing "a final judicial decision of the highest court of ajurisdiction in a particular case"). But see 18 MooRE's, supra note 3, § 133.3013] [a], at
133-21 (describing Rooker-Feldman as depriving lower federal courts of "jurisdiction to
review state court judgments" without reference to finality in highest state court).
6 See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 13.1-.4 (3d ed. 1999);
LARRY YACKLE, FEDERAL COURTS 388-415 (1999).
ET AL., MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTICE
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doctrine 7 might also force at least a stay, if not ajurisdictional dismissal, of federal adjudication in light of a previously or even subsequently filed parallel state court proceeding.
Despite what might be considerable superfluity in light of this
much overlap with other doctrines, and the lack of focused Supreme
Court attention since the Feldman decision in 1983, the lower federal
courts have come to invoke Rooker-Feldman-often to find no jurisdiction-with notable frequency. Such judicial use of the doctrine may
be understandable, given proper subordination by the district and appellate courts to what they regard as binding Supreme Court precedent; but it leaves the major question whether and to what extent the
doctrine serves valid independent purposes of its own. 8 This and
other issues concerning the Rooker-Feldman have received strikingly little treatment in academic commentary for a doctrine upon which the
courts have come increasingly to rely. 9
The four articles that follow admirably fill this gap in the commentary, and the authors are especially qualified to speak on this subject: Suzanna Sherry is co-author of the casebook that includes the
most extensive treatment of Rooker-Feldman in any book now on the
market. 10 Susan Bandes is author of the chapter covering Rooker-Feldman in the new third edition of Moore's FederalPractice." Barry Friedman (joined here by student co-author James Gaylord) and Jack
Beermann are among the few scholars to have treated the doctrine in
2
previous law review commentary.'
7

See, e.g.,

CHEMERINSKY,

supra note 6, §§ 12.1-.3, 14.1-.4; YACKLE, supra note 6,

at 373-88.

8 See, e.g., 18 WRGrr ET AL., supra note 3, § 4469, at 529 (Supp. 1998)
("Although no substantial harm seems to have been done by the [Rooker-Feldman]
jurisdictional cases, it would be better to go straight to the res judicata rules that
justify preclusion.") (footnote omitted).
9 Since the Feldman decision in 1983, the two sustained law review treatments of
the area have both been student notes: Benjamin Smith, Note, Texaco, Inc. v.
Pennzoil Co.: Beyond a CrudeAnalysis of the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine'sPreclusion of FederalJurisdiction,41 U. MmiAI L. REv. 627 (1987); Gary Thompson, Note, The RookerFeldman Doctrine and the Subject MatterJurisdictionofFederalDistrict Courts, 42 RUTGERs
L. Ruv. 859 (1990). Two articles by law professors contributing to this issue also included discussion of Rooker-Feldman:Jack M. Beermann, Government Official Torts and
the Takings Clause: Federalism and State Sovereign Immunity, 68 B.U. L. REv. 277, 340-42

(1988); Barry Friedman, Pas de Deux: The Supreme Court and the Habeas Courts, 66 S.
CAL. L. REv. 2467, 2472-73, 2476, 2480 (1993).
10 See MARTIN H. REDISH & SUZANNA SHERRY, FEDERAL COURTS: CAsEs, COMMENTS
AND QUxSrIONs 575-84 (4th ed. 1998).

11 See 18 MooRE's, supra note 3, § 133.30[3].
12 See Beermann, supra note 9; Friedman, supra note 9. Papers on which the
Rooker-Feldman articles in this issue are based were presented in New Orleans inJanu-
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I will not summarize the contributions here because Jack Beermann's commentary 13 on the three principal papers14 does that admirably and would make a similar effort on my part duplicative. Instead,
I will highlight two principal points of apparent agreement: First, despite the different positions taken-with Suzanna Sherry finding some
virtue in Rooker-Feldman and Barry Friedman and Susan Bandes coming largely to bury the doctrine, not to praise it-I discern no claim
even by Sherry that the doctrine makes a major contribution or difference beyond the effects of other limits on federal courts' exercise of
their powers. That I take to square with the views of Friedman,
Bandes, and Beermann.
Second, the proliferation of lower court case law with many different emphases and some highly questionable decisions I5 suggests
that the time may be nigh for the Supreme Court to take an opportunity to clarify the doctrine. Not knowing what the Supreme Court
might do if it took a Rooker-Feldman case, I drop that hint with some
trepidation; but the papers in this issue should give the Court much
help if it chooses to do so. The academy has done itsjob, and it is now
the Court's turn.

ary, 1999 at the annual session of the Association of American Law School's section
on Federal Courts, for which I served as program chair. All the authors were a plea-

sure to work with, at long range and in person-prompt, cooperative, delightfully
humorous, and scrupulous and respectful in disagreement. I want to take this opportunity to thank them publicly, and to wish other program chairs such superb panelists.
Thanks also to Susan Bandes for originally suggesting the idea of the program, and to
the Notre Dame Law Review for its interest in publishing the papers.
13

Beermann, supra note 1.

14 Susan Bandes, The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine: EvaluatingIts JurisdictionalStatus,
74 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1175 (1999); Barry Friedman &James Gaylord, Rooker-Feldman, From the Ground Up, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1129 (1999); Suzanna Sherry, Judicial Federalism in the Trenches: The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine in Action, 74 NOTRE DAME
L. REv. 1085 (1999).
15 See, e.g., Kamilewicz v. Bank of Boston Corp., No. 95 C 6341, 1995 WL 758422
(N.D. Ill. Dec. 15, 1995), affid, 92 F.3d 506 (7th Cir.), rehearingand rehearingen banc
denied, 100 F.3d 1348 (7th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1569 (1997). For criticism
of Kamilewicz see, for example, 18 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 3, § 4469, at 529 (Supp.
1998); Susan P. Koniak & George M. Cohen, Under Cloak of Settlement, 82 VA. L. REV.
1051, 1270-80 (1996).

